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Abstract
Elites often mobilize science and religion to support opposing positions on issues ranging from abortion to families to
criminal justice. However, there is little research on the extent to which public preferences for scientific and religious
understandings relate to public opinion about these and other controversies. The authors analyze how perspectives on
science and religion map onto public attitudes about a wide range of social, political, and economic issues. Using General
Social Survey data, the authors find that individuals oriented toward either science or religion hold differing attitudes in
nearly every domain investigated. However, individuals whose worldviews incorporate both science and religion stand
apart in surprising ways, which suggests that this third perspective is not located on a conventional liberal-conservative
spectrum. Previous research has identified religious-scientific perspectives as a basis for polarization about issues that
intersect science and religion, but the authors find that the conflict is far more widespread.
Keywords
science, religion, public opinion, political culture

In a 2015 American Sociological Review article, we found
that the U.S. public is marked by three broad perspectives on
science and religion: a traditional one, which holds religion
in relatively high and science in relatively low esteem; a
modern one, with the opposite point of view; and a postsecular one, which is knowledgeable about and appreciative of
science but which is religiously devout and which rejects
mainstream scientific accounts of evolution and the big bang
(O’Brien and Noy 2015). Moreover, we found that these
worldviews correspond to attitudes about controversies
related to science and religion, such as stem cell research,
independently of other antecedents of public opinion, including race, socioeconomic status, gender, and political ideology. An important implication of this and other recent
research is that the science-religion boundary is an area of
cultural rather than epistemological conflict (Baker 2012;
Evans 2013; Evans and Evans 2008; Johnson, Scheitle, and
Ecklund 2015). This suggests that perspectives on science
and religion may be associated with deeper divides in public
opinion. As central institutions in American public life, elites
often invoke scientific and religious knowledge and authority in public controversies. Consequently, individuals’ views
of science and religion may correspond to their sociopolitical
attitudes in far-reaching ways. However, little research to
date has examined how public orientations toward scientific

and religious understandings fit into American political culture more broadly.
In this article, we extend our analysis of perspectives on
science and religion in the United States to determine the
extent to which they map onto public attitudes about a
broad array of social, political, and economic issues. We
address two related questions: (1) Do perspectives on science and religion divide public opinion about issues that
are not directly related to science or religion? (2) If so, are
the differences issue specific, or do they extend across
domains? The results suggest that individuals who are oriented toward either science or religion hold differing attitudes about nearly every issue we investigate. However,
individuals whose worldviews blend science and religion
stand apart in surprising ways, which suggests that this
third perspective is not located on a conventional liberalconservative spectrum.
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Religion, Science, and Public Opinion
Despite the paucity of scholarship on how perspectives on
religion and science correspond to public opinion, there is
ample research on the social, political, and economic attitudes of religious Americans. These studies show that religious people tend to hold conservative social and cultural
beliefs about issues such as abortion, assisted suicide, gender, sexuality, race, and deviance (Bolzendahl and Myers
2004; Ferree et al. 2002; Gielen, van den Branden, and
Broeckaert 2009; Hinojosa and Park 2004; Rothwell and
Hawdon 2008; Whitehead and Baker 2002). However, studies have also linked religiosity to progressive attitudes about
topics including the economy, the environment, and human
rights (Davis and Robinson 2006; Kearns 2013; Swartz
2013). Thus, although religious belief is often associated
with a conservative political ideology, a religious worldview
may lead to progressive attitudes in certain domains.
Researchers have also found that trust in science is higher
among self-described liberals (Gauchat 2012) and that
scientists, especially social scientists, disproportionately
hold liberal social views (Gross and Simmons 2009).
Nevertheless, some scholars view organized science as a
racialized and gendered system, which discounts and marginalizes non-White, nonmale voices and experiences
(Benjamin 2013). This suggests that scientifically inclined
individuals may hold relatively conservative beliefs about
issues related to gender, sexuality, race, and other topics that
may challenge White, male hegemony. Taken together,
existing studies on science suggest that the sociopolitical
attitudes of scientifically minded Americans may be domain
specific.

Data
We analyze data from the 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014
waves of the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine
whether and how perspectives on science and religion map
onto U.S. public opinion. The GSS is a nationally representative survey of noninstitutionalized U.S. adults conducted
biennially using a multistage area-probability sampling
frame. The GSS contains questions about a wide range of
social, political, and economic attitudes, which we use as
dependent variables in a regression analysis, and which are
summarized in Table 1. Sample sizes for dependent variables
vary according to the survey’s split-ballot design and because
of missing data. We use questions about science knowledge
and attitudes along with questions about respondents’ religious beliefs to measure religious-scientific perspectives.
GSS data also contain detailed information on respondent
characteristics, which are control variables in our analysis.
Table 1 summarizes independent and control variables for
the 3,640 cases with complete information on these items
(1,318 from 2006, 811 from 2008, 289 from 2010, 336 from
2012, and 886 from 2014).
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Dependent Variables: Social, Political, and
Economic Attitudes
Dependent variables are organized into seven domains.
When consecutive survey questions were asked about a single topic using a common response metric, we used factor
analysis to scale the items. Three of the scales had Cronbach’s
α values less than .60. In supplemental analysis, we examined scaled items separately and reached similar conclusions
to those we discuss below. The first domain we investigate
focuses on issues often framed in relation to human life,
including abortion, contraception, capital punishment, euthanasia, and suicide. A second set of outcomes focuses on gender and sexuality and includes questions about gender roles,
divorce, sexuality, and sex education. A third category examines attitudes about race and civil liberties and contains
questions about affirmative action, causes of Black-White
differences, and civil liberties for various social groups. A
fourth set of outcomes focuses on attitudes about government and social assistance and includes questions about
government expenditures, the government’s role in reducing
inequality, and taxes. A fifth category of outcomes measures
attitudes about criminal justice and contains questions about
drug laws and the use of force by police. A sixth category
contains attitudes about children and schools, including
child-rearing practices, traits respondents value in children,
and whether prayer should be allowed in public schools. A
seventh set outcomes examines personal well-being and
interpersonal trust and includes measures of self-reported
health, happiness, excitement about life, and about the extent
to which respondents believe others are helpful, fair, and
trustworthy.

Independent Variable: Perspectives on Science
and Religion
To capture perspectives on science and religion, we replicated our earlier latent class analysis (LCA) using more
recently available data (O’Brien and Noy 2015). In survey
contexts, LCA detects underlying groups of respondents
on the basis of patterns of observed responses (Magidson
and Vermunt 2001). Although this “types-of-respondent”
approach differs from the “types-of-variables” approach
(i.e., factor analysis) we used to create several scales of
dependent variables for our regression analysis, the purpose of the LCA is to identify unobserved worldviews
related to knowledge of and attitudes about science and
religion. In contrast, the aim of the factor analysis is to
reduce the number of dependent variables for a more parsimonious investigation of sociopolitical attitudes.
Combining these approaches allows us to examine the
extent to which individuals’ orientations toward science
and religion, two critical sources of knowledge and authority, relate to public views about a wide spectrum of issues
in American society.
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Independent variables
Traditional perspective
Modern perspective
Postsecular perspective
Dependent variables
Life
   Abortion Permissiveness Scale I (under any circumstances, if the woman does not
want additional children, because of poverty, if the woman is single)a
   Abortion Permissiveness Scale II (in case of rape, in case mother’s health is
endangered, in case of fetal defect)a
   Supports teen birth controlb
   Favor gun permitsc
   Suicide Permissiveness Scale (if incurable disease, bankrupt, dishonored family, tired
of living)a
   Let incurable patients diec
   Oppose death penalty for murderc
Gender and sexuality
   Gender ideology (higher is more permissive; women not suited for politics, mother
working does not hurt children, preschool children suffer if mother works, better
for man to work and woman to tend the home)a
   Support easier divorce lawsd
   Sex attitudes (higher is more permissive; homosexual relationships, same-sex
marriage, extramarital sex, premarital sex)a
   Liberal pornography viewse
   Favor sex education in schoolsb
Race and civil liberties
   Supports affirmative actionf
   Black-White differences due to individual differences (lack of inborn ability and lack
of will)a
   Black-White differences due to structural factors (lack of education and
discrimination)a
   Blacks overcome prejudice without favorsg

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest.

—
—
—

3.69
2.42
1.04
—
3.02
—
—
2.77

0.86
3.03
0.52
—
0.98
1.56
1.62
1.23

0.16
0.15
2.65
0.76
−0.05
0.70
0.33
0.19

1.85
−0.26
1.69
0.91
1.75
−0.02
−0.06
3.94

Standard Deviation

0.42
0.37
0.21

Mean

1

−1.67

1
−1.30

1
0

1
−4.35

−8.49

0
0

1
0
−2.38

−6.31

−3.52

0
0
0

Minimum

5

2.42

4
4.09

3
1

3
7.33

4.86

1
1

4
1
8.81

1.48

4.55

1
1
1

Maximum

(continued)

2,181

2,130

2,135
2,116

3,194
2,166

2,116
422

2,082

1,785
3,512

1,820
1,877
2,090

1,793

1,809

3,640
3,640
3,640

Sample Size

4

   Allow groups’ books in library (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists,
racists)a
   Allow groups to speak publically (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists,
racists)a
   Allow groups to teach (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists, racists)a
Government and social assistance
   Government Assistance Scale (higher is more support; should do more, improve
standard of living, help with medical bills, help Blacks)a
   Supports government reducing inequalityh
   Taxes too lowi
   Success in life: luck/help more than hard workj
   Expect U.S. at war in next 10 yearsc
Criminal justice
   Guns in homec
   Police Use of Force Scale I (higher is less permissive; due to vulgar speech or if
citizen is murder suspect)a
   Police Use of Force Scale II (higher is less permissive; if hitting the officer, if
attempting to escape, ever)a
  Legalize marajuanac
   Courts dealing with criminals (higher is more harshly)k
Children and schools
   How important is it that your child: help othersl
   How important is it that your child: obeyl
   How important is it that your child: be well-liked/popularl
   How important is it that your child: think for themselvesl
   How important is it that your child: work hardl
   Do not favor spanking to discipline a childb
   Approve Supreme Court ruling against Bible prayer in public schoolsm
Personal well-being and interpersonal trust
   Personal satisfaction (higher is more satisfied; personal happiness, health, excitement
about life, happiness in marriage)a
   Interpersonal trust (people are helpful, fair, trustworthy)a

Table 1. (continued)
Standard Deviation
3.75
3.53
2.57
2.95
1.96
0.53
0.68
—
—
1.58
2.18
—
0.70
0.98
1.25
0.58
1.25
0.96
0.84
—
2.53
2.33

Mean
0.33
0.41
0.11
−0.04
4.31
1.47
1.41
0.56
0.35
−0.05
0.25
0.46
1.45
3.49
2.63
1.27
3.88
3.72
2.12
0.43
0.68
0.12

−2.98

−8.26

1
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
1

−5.73

0
−0.71

1
1
1
0

−6.41

−6.40

−8.50

−8.13

Minimum

3.38

4.25

5
5
5
5
5
4
1

1
3

1.70

1
5.71

7
3
3
1

6.39

4.47

3.11

3.11

Maximum

(continued)

3,189

898

2,532
2,532
2,532
2,532
2,532
2,174
2,133

2,991
3,434

2,733

1,877
3,095

3,187
1,868
1,886
1,405

3,046

1,769

1,841

1,837

Sample Size
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—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.77
—
—
—
—
—
2.89
1.04
1.43
—
1.63

0.10
0.14
0.04
0.72
13.85
10.65
4.07
0.27
4.68

Standard Deviation

0.16
0.25
0.25
0.08
0.02
0.05
0.19
3.51
0.53

Mean

0
0
0
0
0
6.21
1
0
1.80

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Minimum

1
1
1
1
20
12.06
7
1
8.90

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1

Maximum

3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640

3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640
3,640

Sample Size

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves.
aWhen consecutive survey items were asked about the same topic and measured on the same response metric, we used factor analysis to determine whether items could be scaled. On the basis of factor analysis results, we
created standardized summative scales.
b1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.
c0 = No, 1 = yes.
d[Should be] 1 = more difficult, 2 = stay the same, 3 = easier.
e1 = There should be laws against the distribution of pornography whatever the age; 2 = there should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18; 3 = there should be no laws forbidding the distribution of
pornography.
f1 = Strongly oppose preferential treatment; 2 = oppose preferential treatment; 3 = support preferential treatment; 4 = strongly support preferential treatment.
g1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree.
h1 = Government should not, 7 = government should (includes options 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6).
i1 = Too high, 2 = about right, 3 = too low.
j1 = Hard work most important; 2 = hard work, luck equally important; 3 = luck most important.
k1 = Not harsh enough, 2 = about right, 3 = too harsh.
l1 = Least important, 2 = fourth most important, 3 = third most important, 4 = second most important, 5 = most important.
m0 = Disapprove, 1 = approve.

Controls
Religious tradition
  Mainline Protestant
  Conservative Protestant
  Catholic
  Black Protestant
  Jewish
  Other faith
   No religious affiliation
Religious attendance (0 = never, 8 = more than once per week)
Female
Race/ethnicity
  Latino
   African American (non-Latino)
   Other race (non-Latino)
  White (non-Latino)
Education (in years)
Income (natural log transformation of household income category midpoints)
Political ideology (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative)
Lives in South
Age (in years, divided by 10)

Table 1. (continued)
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We conducted our LCA with Mplus software using 20
variables that measure attitudes and knowledge about science and attitudes about religion and religious-based knowledge. These items are summarized in Appendix Table A1.
Attitudes about science are measured as four- and five-point
ordinal variables. These come from survey questions that
asked (1) whether science creates more opportunities for the
next generation, (2) whether science makes life move too
fast, (3) whether science should be supported by government
funding, and (4) whether the benefits of science outweigh its
costs. Science knowledge is measured using 14 true-or-false
questions about scientific concepts and methods such as
radioactivity and experimental design. Two questions about
areas of contested knowledge, the big bang and evolution,
are critical points of distinction between latent classes.
Indicators of religiosity included a four-point ordinal
measure of the intensity of respondents’ religious beliefs and
a nominal measure based on a question that asked whether
the Bible is (1) the actual word of God, (2) inspired by the
word of God, or (3) filled with myths and fables. Although
questions about the Bible are most salient to respondents
with connections to Christianity, self-identified Christians
are a large majority of the sample. Furthermore, focusing on
attitudes about religion and religious knowledge rather than
institutional or behavioral measures such as religious traditions or attendance allows us to tap the religious values of
respondents who do not participate in religious institutions
but whose worldviews may incorporate religious belief.
Analyses that contained additional indicator variables for
religion including belief in God, belief in an afterlife, and
confidence in clergy (summarized in Appendix Table A2) led
to the same conclusions as those we discuss below.
The LCA identified three distinct religious-scientific perspectives: a traditional one with high religiosity and low
knowledge and appreciation of science (42 percent), a modern one with high knowledge and appreciation of science and
low religiosity (37 percent), and a postsecular one with high
religiosity that is generally appreciative of and knowledgeable about science but rejects mainstream scientific theories
of evolution and the big bang (21 percent). Fit statistics for
the LCA are presented in Table 2, and the sociodemographic
profile of each group is reported in Table 3. Although data
reduction techniques such as LCA generalize complex social
phenomena into ideal types, the categories we identify are
theoretically driven, empirically robust, and analytically useful for capturing religious-scientific orientations. Although
other typologies based on religious traditions or attitudes
about specific scientific controversies could be used to study
viewpoints about science and religion, the categories we analyze provide a unique approach to examining the sciencereligion boundary that focuses on knowledge and belief
rather than behavior and which does not presume a causal
relationship between preferences for scientific and religious
understandings.
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Table 2. Fit Statistics for Latent Class Analysis.
Number of Classes
1
2
3b
4
5
6
7

pa

BIC

df

—
<.01
<.01
.76
.76
.78
.76

96,937.811
93,160.112
92,303.741
91,971.204
91,848.961
91,816.431
91,819.745

32
65
98
131
164
197
230

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves.
Note: The latent class analysis is based on 4,347 cases with complete
information on indicator variables. Similar results were obtained using a
restricted sample of 3,640 cases with complete information on indicator
and control variables. BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
aFrom Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test.
bPreferred number of latent classes.

Control Variables: Sociodemographic
Characteristics
Our regression analysis includes controls for several relevant
respondent characteristics. We measure religious traditions
using mutually exclusive binary indicators for conservative,
mainline, and Black Protestants, Catholics, Jews, followers
of other faiths, and those who are not associated with organized religion. We measure religious attendance with an
eight-category ordinal variable.1 We measure race using
binary variables for non-Latino African American, Latino,
non-Latino White, and non-Latino other race. We measure
age in years. We measure geographic location using a binary
measure for residents of the South. We measure political ideology on a seven-point ordinal scale. We measure education
in years and income as a natural log transformation of household income category midpoints. Finally, because we pool
several waves of GSS data, we include binary controls for
survey year.

Analysis
We use regression models to examine differences in public
opinion associated with traditional, modern, and postsecular
perspectives on science and religion. The metric of the
dependent variable determined our choice among linear,
binary logistic, and ordinal logistic regression models.
Group differences discussed in the text are statistically significant, net of control variables (p < .05). We report y-standardized regression coefficients for our key independent
variables to facilitate comparison across models. Because of
the large number of models we present, we do not report
coefficient estimates for control variables or model constants and cut points, which are available upon request. All
statistical analyses use recommended GSS sampling
weights. Descriptive and regression analyses were performed using Stata software.
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Table 3. Sociodemographic Information by Latent Class.
Conditional Means by Latent Class
Traditional
(n = 1,514)
Religious tradition
Mainline Protestant
Conservative Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other faith
No religious affiliation
Religious attendance (0 = never, 8 = more than once per week)
Female
Race/ethnicity
Latino
African American (non-Latino)
Other race (non-Latino)
White (non-Latino)
Education (in years)
Income (natural log transformation of household income category midpoints)
Political ideology (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative)
Lives in South
Age (in years, divided by 10)

Modern
(n = 1,362)

Postsecular
(n = 764)

0.13MP
0.25MP
0.29MP
0.15MP
0.01M
0.04M
0.12MP
3.68MP
0.60M

0.19T
0.10TP
0.24TP
0.01TP
0.03TP
0.06T
0.37TP
2.29TP
0.44TP

0.17T
0.50MT
0.18MT
0.07MT
0.01M
0.05
0.02MT
5.35MT
0.57M

0.17MP
0.25MP
0.04P
0.54MP
12.49MP
10.30MP
4.12MP
0.30MP
4.75M

0.06T
0.04TP
0.04P
0.85T
15.17TP
10.91T
3.64TP
0.20TP
4.52TP

0.05T
0.09MT
0.02MT
0.85T
14.20MT
10.85T
4.75MT
0.35MT
4.80M

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves (n = 3,640).
Note: Significant differences among perspectives are indicated by superscript letters as follows: M = significantly different from modern, p < .05 (two-tailed
t test); P = significantly different from postsecular, p < .05 (two-tailed t test); T = significantly different from traditional, p < .05 (two-tailed t test).

Results

Human Life

Table 4 contains results from regressions of public opinion
on religious-scientific perspectives. Several overarching
patterns are evident. First, orientations toward science and
religion map onto public opinion in far-reaching ways.
Moreover, the differences exist net of other political,
denominational, and class differences, suggesting that these
worldviews do not simply mirror other social cleavages.
Together, these findings offer evidence of the external
validity of the statistical clusters identified by the LCA.
Second, traditional and modern perspectives on science and
religion are associated with distinctive beliefs in all but one
of the domains we investigate. Importantly, these divides
may be a source of political polarization, as the differences
imply disagreement about a broad range of public policies.
Third, the postsecular attitudinal profile resembles the traditional profile in some ways and the modern profile in others but stands apart from each other group in some domains.
As we discuss later, the issues postseculars align with and
break against moderns and traditionals are important to
identify because this relatively small segment of the public
(21 percent) may play an outsized role in shaping social
discourse and public policy.

The first set of outcomes in Table 4 suggests that moderns
are generally most tolerant of humans intervening in what
are often viewed as natural processes related to human life.
In contrast, postseculars and traditionals each prefer that
humans play a more limited role in this arena. For example,
traditionals are less supportive than moderns of abortion
rights, and postseculars are even less supportive than traditionals. Similarly, postseculars and traditionals are each
less supportive than moderns of making contraceptives
accessible to teenagers. Postseculars and traditionals are
also less likely than moderns to agree that it is acceptable
for individuals to end their own lives and that patients with
incurable diseases have a right to die. Although moderns
are generally most tolerant of human agency in this domain,
they are more likely than traditionals to oppose the death
penalty. This first set of results points to an association
between a scientific mind-set and a belief that humans
should be allowed to intercede in what may be seen as natural events. However, postseculars’ restrictive beliefs about
abortion and other issues in this domain are evidence that
appreciation and understanding of science do not necessarily lead to liberal social attitudes.
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Life
Abortion Permissiveness Scale I (under any circumstances, if the woman does not want additional
children, because of poverty, if the woman is single)
Abortion Permissiveness Scale II (in case of rape, in case mother’s health is endangered, in case of fetal
defect)
Supports teen birth control
Favor gun permits
Suicide Permissiveness Scale (if incurable disease, bankrupt, dishonored family, tired of living)
Let incurable patients die
Oppose death penalty for murder
Gender and sexuality
Gender ideology (higher is more permissive; women not suited for politics, mother working does not
hurt children, preschool children suffer if mother works, better for man to work and woman to tend
the home)
Support easier divorce laws
Sex attitudes (higher is more permissive; homosexual relationships, same sex marriage, extramarital sex,
premarital sex)
Liberal pornography views
Favor sex education in schools
Race and civil liberties
Supports affirmative action
Black-White differences due to individual differences (lack of inborn ability and lack of will)
Black-White differences due to structural factors (lack of education and discrimination)
Blacks overcome prejudice without favors
Allow groups’ books in library (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists, racists)
Allow groups to speak publically (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists, racists)
Allow groups to teach (atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists, racists)
Government and social assistance
Government Assistance Scale (higher is more support; should do more, improve standard of living, help
with medical bills, help Blacks)
Supports government reducing inequality
−0.15*
−0.30***
−0.02
−0.28**
−0.01
−0.08
0.08
0.05

−0.11
−0.17
0.06
0.11
−0.32***
−0.30***
0.05
−0.09
0.41***
0.28***
0.13
−0.09+
−0.15**

0.17*
0.32***
−0.14+
0.21**
0.26*
0.21***
0.39***

0.07
0.53***
0.47***
0.76***
−0.12*
−0.26***
0.21***
−0.27***
0.42***
0.33***
0.06
−0.01
−0.05

Postsecular
(Omitted Category
Is Traditional)

0.40***

Modern (Omitted
Category Is
Traditional)

Table 4. Standardized Coefficients from Regressions of Public Opinion on Traditional, Modern, and Postsecular Perspectives.a

−0.10

−0.09

−0.19*
−0.04
−0.16*
0.18*
−0.01
−0.05
0.07

−0.41***
−0.65***

−0.18*
−0.70***

−0.34***

−0.34***
−0.14
−0.22***
−0.33**
−0.13

−0.47***

−0.55***

Postsecular
(Omitted Category
Is Modern)

(continued)

Linear

Linear

Ordinal
Linear
Linear
Ordinal
Linear
Linear
Linear

Ordinal
Logistic

Ordinal
Linear

Linear

Ordinal
Logistic
Linear
Logistic
Logistic

Linear

Linear

Regression
Model
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0.01
0.24*
−0.29**
0.19*
−0.17**
0.17**
0.10
0.10
−0.03
−0.14*
−0.12
0.22***
−0.01
0.12
0.17*
0.10
0.26***

0.04
−0.19***
0.23***
0.28***
0.23***
0.04
−0.38***
0.17*
0.28***
0.04
0.27***
0.51***
0.10
0.29***

Postsecular
(Omitted Category
Is Traditional)

0.13
0.28*
−0.27**

Modern (Omitted
Category Is
Traditional)

−0.03

<0.01

−0.07
0.24***
−0.29**
−0.06
−0.05
−0.15
−0.34***

0.15
0.02
−0.06
−0.18**
−0.12

−0.12
−0.04
−0.02

Postsecular
(Omitted Category
Is Modern)

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves.
Note: Coefficients are y-standardized. Constants (for linear and binary logistic regression) and cut points (for ordinal regression) are not reported.
aCoefficients for control variables not reported. Controls include religious tradition, religious service attendance, race, age, education, income, political ideology, region of residence, gender, and survey year.
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Taxes too low
Success in life: luck/help more than hard work
Expect U.S. in war in next 10 years
Criminal justice
Guns in home
Police Use of Force Scale I (higher is less permissive; due to vulgar speech or if citizen is murder suspect)
Police Use of Force Scale II (higher is less permissive; if hitting the officer, if attempting to escape, ever)
Legalize marijuana
Courts dealing with criminals (higher is more harshly)
Children and schools
How important is it that your child: help others
How important is it that your child: obey
How important is it that your child: be well-liked/popular
How important is it that your child: think for themselves
How important is it that your child: work hard
Do not favor spanking to discipline a child
Approve of Supreme Court ruling against Bible prayer in public schools
Personal well-being and interpersonal trust
Personal satisfaction (higher is more satisfied; personal happiness, health, excitement about life,
happiness in marriage)
Interpersonal trust (people are helpful, fair, trustworthy)

Table 4. (continued)

Linear

Linear

Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Logistic

Logistic
Linear
Linear
Logistic
Ordinal

Ordinal
Ordinal
Logistic

Regression
Model

10

Gender and Sexuality
The second domain in Table 4 includes attitudes about gender and sexuality. Results indicate that compared with each
other group, moderns hold more progressive views of gender
roles, sexuality, pornography, and sex education. There are
no significant differences in postseculars’ and traditionals’
attitudes in this area, indicating that as with attitudes about
human life, familiarity with science does not ensure liberal
sociopolitical beliefs.

Race and Civil Liberties
The third set of outcomes in Table 4 turns attention to race
and civil liberties. Given their liberal views on gender and
sexuality, it is perhaps surprising that moderns are less supportive than traditionals of affirmative action. Postseculars
are even less supportive than moderns of affirmative action.
Yet this pattern aligns with moderns’ and postseculars’
greater likelihood of agreeing that African Americans can
overcome prejudice without favors. In addition, traditionals
and postseculars are more likely than moderns to explain
Black-White differences in terms of innate qualities, whereas
moderns are more likely than traditionals to attribute race
disparities to educational opportunities and discrimination.
This is consistent with Hunt’s (2007) finding that religious
fundamentalists tend to favor individual over structural
explanations for racial inequality. Our results extend this
knowledge by showing that a religious orientation is associated with person-centered explanations of racial inequality
independently of religious traditions.
Traditionals and moderns also take different stances on
civil liberties. Moderns are more likely than traditionals to
agree that atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, militarists, and racists should be able to place books in public
libraries and to speak publically. Postseculars are also more
supportive than traditionals of these civil liberties these
groups. Overall, this third set of results suggests that whereas
modern and traditional attitudes about race and civil liberties
break in mostly anticipated ways, postseculars’ comparatively progressive views on civil liberties contrast against
their more conservative beliefs about life, gender, sexuality,
and race.

Government and Social Assistance
The next set of results in Table 4 examines attitudes about
government and social assistance. Findings are largely
inconsistent with research that associates a religious orientation with communitarian economic attitudes (Davis and
Robinson 2006). However, neither traditionals’ nor postseculars’ beliefs about social assistance programs are significantly different than moderns’. In other words, traditionals
and postseculars are not marked by uniquely egalitarian
economic beliefs. In fact, although postseculars are more
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religious than traditionals, they are less supportive than traditionals of government efforts to reduce inequality.
The final two outcomes in this domain indicate that traditionals are more likely than each other group to expect the
United States to go to war in the next decade, and they are
more likely to believe that success in life is due to internal
factors (e.g., hard work) rather than external ones (e.g., luck
or help). These patterns are consistent with traditionals’ individualistic views of racial inequality. However, in contrast to
the first three sets of outcomes, religious-scientific perspectives do little to differentiate public opinion about government and its role in citizens’ lives.

Criminal Justice
Similar to other domains, moderns and traditionals differ in
their responses to most questions about criminal justice.
Interestingly, although moderns are less likely than traditionals to approve of the police’s use of force in some situations,
moderns are more likely than traditionals to approve of
police force under other circumstances. Furthermore, compared with traditionals, moderns report that courts should
deal with criminals more harshly. Postseculars’ opinions in
this domain generally resemble moderns with one exception:
despite moderns’ relatively tough-on-crime attitudes, they
are more likely than each other group to support the decriminalization of marijuana. Thus, alongside postseculars’ conservative views on certain social issues, moderns’ support for
police force in some instances and for the harsh treatment of
criminals further calls into question the notion that science is
invariably associated with liberal policy preferences.

Children, Families, and Schools
Moderns’ beliefs about children, families, and schools contrast against traditionals’ and postseculars’ in ways that imply
broad differences in home life for these groups. For example,
traditionals stress children’s obedience more than moderns,
whereas moderns attach more importance than traditionals to
children’s social acceptance and independent thinking.
Postseculars share moderns’ emphasis on independent thinking but emphasize obedience more and social acceptance less
than moderns. Furthermore, traditionals are more likely than
moderns to view spanking as an acceptable form of punishment for children. Finally, consistent with the prominence of
faith in the traditional and postsecular worldviews, these
groups are each more likely than moderns to approve of
prayer in public schools.

Personal Well-being and Interpersonal Trust
The final domain examines attitudes about personal health and
well-being and interpersonal trust. Although there are no differences in self-reported life satisfaction, perceptions of other
people vary across religious-scientific perspectives. Compared
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with traditionals, moderns see other people as more helpful,
trustworthy, and fair. Postseculars, too, report more positive
interpersonal attitudes compared with traditionals. Together
with their attitudes toward social assistance and race relations,
this finding further illustrates the importance of individualism
associated with a traditional worldview.
To summarize, Table 4 suggests that perspectives on science and religion correspond to extensive differences in traditionals’ and moderns’ attitudes. In most, but not all,
domains, moderns’ beliefs are relatively liberal or inclusive,
whereas traditionals’ are more conservative or exclusive.
However, the postsecular perspective defies this binary.
Individuals in this category, who are familiar with and appreciative of science and also deeply religious, are marked by
sociopolitical attitudes that cannot be consistently labeled
conservative or liberal. For example, postseculars’ attitudes
about government spending and social assistance and about
criminal justice are largely indistinguishable from moderns’.
In contrast, postseculars’ attitudes about gender and sexuality mostly resemble traditionals’. Yet when it comes to issues
such as affirmative action and school prayer, postseculars’
beliefs stand apart from each other worldview. Overall, the
findings indicate that religious-scientific perspectives in the
United States correspond to deep-seated cleavages in social,
political, and economic attitudes, which cannot be accounted
for by religious traditions, political ideologies, or other
sociodemographic differences.

Conclusion
There is growing evidence that the conventional assumption
of conflict between science and religion is overstated. To the
extent that the public does perceive discord between reason
and faith, recent studies indicate that the divides are largely
moral rather than epistemological. Our analysis situates
these divisions within the broader landscape of U.S. political culture. The findings underscore the diversity of sociopolitical attitudes among religious Americans, who are often
portrayed as uniformly conservative, and among scientific
Americans, who are often portrayed as uniformly liberal.
Results show that many of the most devout members of the
U.S. public have relatively progressive views of topics such
as civil liberties and criminal justice. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that familiarity with and appreciation of science
is not necessarily tied to progressive sociopolitical attitudes.
Although scholars increasingly recognize the complexity of
the boundary between science and religion, our investigation is the first to establish that religious-scientific perspectives are associated with far-reaching differences in public
opinion. This suggests that orientations toward science and
religion reflect a previously unaccounted for dimension of
polarization.
Aside from the statistical patterns identified in this article,
perspectives on science and religion are evident in the discourses used to frame public debates about issues including
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marriage and families, education, biomedical research, and
many others. For example, some groups frame access to
abortion in terms of scientific evidence about medical and
reproductive health, whereas others focus on religious doctrine about conception and humans’ role in processes related
to life (Rohlinger 2002). Still others frame the issue by
engaging religious beliefs about the sanctity of life together
with scientific arguments about fetal pain and psychological
trauma experienced by women and health care providers
(Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Williams 2005). By enlisting science and religion to varying degrees, these competing frames
reflect traditional, modern, and postsecular perspectives, and
they illustrate the consequences of these differing worldviews for U.S. political culture. A potentially fruitful avenue
for future research may be to analyze media or policy documents or to conduct interviews to examine how the discourses surrounding political issues arise and the extent to
which publics and other stakeholders knowingly draw on
reason and faith in support of their positions. Nonetheless,
although other approaches to studying linkages between science, religion, and politics are possible, our investigation
provides new insights about widespread patterns in public
opinion and how it relates to broadly held orientations toward
science and religion.
Even with the large number of U.S. adults who do not
identify with organized religion (i.e., the “nones”), we find
that those with relatively little religious attachment are
largely knowledgeable about and appreciative of science. In
contrast, religious individuals differ substantially in the
degree to which their worldviews incorporate science. Given
this, it may be tempting to view postseculars as highly educated traditionals. Although Table 3 indicates that postseculars tend to have more schooling than traditionals, a closer
inspection of the data suggests that the greater continuity
actually lies between the traditional and modern perspectives. Specifically, LCAs with more than three classes indicate that when a fourth latent class is considered, it is
composed of the least religious respondents in the traditional
group and the least scientific respondents in the modern
group. The postsecular group, however, is mostly unchanged
both in size and in the respondents it contains. The continuum between traditionals and moderns is further subdivided
when more than four latent classes are examined. In other
words, this suggests that the postsecular perspective is a distinctive lens for interpreting the world, not just a scientifically sophisticated version of the traditional worldview.
Findings from our analysis should be viewed in light of
the Christian-centric nature of religious life in the United
States. One of the variables we used to identify perspectives
on science and religion focuses on biblical literalism and
may therefore be most meaningful to Christians. However,
roughly three out of every four Americans identifies as
Christian (Gallup 2015), and questions about the Bible likely
resonate with many religiously unaffiliated individuals given
Christianity’s cultural embeddedness in the United States.
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Thus, although survey items about the Bible are valuable
measures of religiosity in the U.S. context, the cultural specificity of religion accentuates the need for cross-national
research on perspectives on science and religion, especially
in societies in which non-Western religious traditions and
institutions are more prevalent.
A practical implication of this study is that individuals in
the postsecular category may have an outsized capacity to
influence public policies, social discourses, and electoral
politics. Traditional and modern views on science and religion are held in comparable numbers and pull attitudes about
many issues in opposing directions. Although the postsecular
perspective is less common, support among postseculars on
issues that divide traditionals and moderns may create a
majority or plurality among the public. This suggests that
democratic institutions in the United States may depend disproportionately on postsecular preferences. Moreover,
because of their relatively high socioeconomic status and the
political sophistication this implies, postseculars may be an
especially vocal and visible minority, further reinforcing
political and cultural divisions. Ironically, this may reify the
narrative of conflict between science and religion despite
these individuals’ tendency to draw on both of these ways of
knowing.
Perhaps the most vexing question raised by this research
is, how do we interpret the relationship between perspectives
on science and religion and public opinion? It may be that
views of these two sources of knowledge and influence spill
over across domains to inform other social, political, and economic beliefs. However, the opposite may also be true, and
sociopolitical attitudes may drive orientations toward science
and religion. A third possibility is that perspectives on science
and religion and sociopolitical attitudes are each manifestations of broader cultural viewpoints. This analysis provides
an intriguing set of results that demonstrate that social cleavages related to science and religion extend far from the intersection of these institutions, although it cannot disentangle
the underlying causal relationships because of the cross-sectional structure of the data we use. Although this investigation
documents the breadth of the attitudinal divide associated
with religious-scientific perspectives, further study is needed
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to pin down the mechanism linking orientations toward science and religion to public opinion about such a wide array of
topics. More work is needed on this intricate cultural landscape, but this article demonstrates the importance of perspectives on science and religion for understanding current
divisions in U.S. political culture.

Appendix
To obtain the key independent variables for this investigation,
we replicated our earlier LCA using updated data (O’Brien
and Noy 2015). We used 20 indicator variables that measured
attitudes about and knowledge of science and attitudes about
religion and religious-based knowledge. Indicator variables
are summarized in Table A1. To choose the number of latent
classes for our model, we relied on Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR)
likelihood ratio tests and the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC). In Table 2, the nonsignificant LMR test from the fourclass model indicates that the three-class model best fits the
data. However, the BIC’s minimum value can also be used to
select the number of latent classes, and the BIC is lowest in
the six-class model. Although the BIC may be preferable for
LCA with continuous indicators, the LMR test is a more reliable indicator of fit for LCA with categorical indicators, such
as ours (Lo, Mendell, and Rubin 2001). Moreover, the BIC is
less reliable when there is a small number of classes and when
class sizes are unequal (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén
2007). Substantively, we found that including more than three
latent classes simply divided the continuum between traditional and modern perspectives into increasingly smaller
groups, while the postsecular category was largely unchanged.
Ultimately, our preference for the more parsimonious threeclass model is based on a combination of statistical, substantive, and theoretical considerations. Table A2 contains results
from an alternative LCA with additional religion indicators,
which show that the three class solution is robust to the inclusion of these variables. Because latent classes are substantively similar with and without additional religion indicators
and because including the additional religion indicators
reduces the number of complete cases for analysis by roughly
24 percent, we exclude them from the LCA.
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Standard Deviation
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

0.65
0.77
0.65

1.06

—
—
—
1.15

Mean (n = 4,347)
—
0.84
0.73
0.62
0.50
0.55
0.56
0.76
0.82
0.37
0.47
0.87
0.77
0.83
0.31

3.28
2.52
3.15

3.13

0.31
0.49
0.20
2.60

0.47M
0.42MP
0.12MP
2.68MP

2.58MP

2.98MP

2.22MP

3.19MP

0.74MP
0.12MP

0.63MP

0.24MP
0.35MP
0.76MP

0.70MP
0.48MP
0.50MP
0.26MP
0.35MP
0.29MP
0.55MP
0.69MP

Traditional (n = 1,856)
0.43

0.03TP
0.55T
0.42TP
2.07TP

3.58TP

3.42TP

2.79TP

3.39TP

0.91TP
0.50TP

0.88T

0.72TP
0.88TP
0.96T

0.95TP
0.92T
0.69TP
0.72TP
0.74TP
0.75T
0.94TP
0.98TP

Modern (n = 1,578)
0.36

Conditional Means by Latent Class

0.48M
0.52T
0.00MT
3.35MT

3.43MT

3.04MT

2.66MT

3.26MT

0.86MT
0.36MT

0.86T

0.06MT
0.02MT
0.96T

0.92MT
0.91T
0.77MT
0.61MT
0.63MT
0.77T
0.88MT
0.78MT

Postsecular (n = 913)
0.21

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves (n = 4,347).
Note: Significant differences among perspectives are indicated by superscript letters as follows: M = significantly different from modern, p < .05 (two-tailed t test); P = significantly different from postsecular, p < .05 (two-tailed t test);
T = significantly different from traditional, p < .05 (two-tailed t test).

Class size
Science knowledge (scientifically correct answer = 1, else = 0)
Center of the earth is very hot
All radioactivity is manmade
The father’s gene decides whether a baby is a boy or a girl
Lasers work by focusing sound waves
Electrons are smaller than atoms
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria
Does sun go around earth or earth around sun?
Continents have been moving for millions of years and will
move in the future
The universe began with huge explosion
Human beings developed from earlier species of animals
Does a one-in-four chance of inherited illness mean that if the
first child has the illness, the next three will not?
Does a one-in-four chance of inherited illness mean that each
child has the same risk of having the illness?
Understand experimental research design
Clear understanding of what it means to study something
scientifically
Science attitudes
Science and technology create more opportunities for the next
generation (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree).
Science makes our way of life change too fast (1 = strongly
agree, 4 = strongly disagree).
Scientific research that advances the frontiers of knowledge is
necessary and should be supported by the federal government
(1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree).
Do the benefits of scientific research outweigh the harmful
results (0 = harm strongly outweighs benefits, 2 = harm and
benefits about equal, 4 = benefits strongly outweigh harm)?
Religion indicators
Bible is the actual word of God (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Bible is inspired by the word of God (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Bible is a book of myths and fables (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Strength of religious affiliation (1 = none, 4 = very strong)

Overall sample

Table A1. Descriptions of Indicator Variables Used to Measure Perspectives on Science and Religion.
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Table A2. Fit Statistics for Alternative Latent Class Analysis with Additional Religion Indicators.

Full model plus belief in
God (GOD) + belief
in afterlife (POSTLIFE)
+ confidence in
clergy (CONCLER) +
confidence in science
(CONSCI)

Number of Classes

pa

BIC

Percentage Reduction in BIC

df

1
2
3b
4
5
6
7

—
<.01
.02
.36
.76
.77
.79

121,002.01
116,053.55
114,386.14
113,727.60
113,285.07
113,113.18
113,110.54

—
4
1
<1
<1
<1
<1

42
85
128
171
214
257
300

Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves (n = 3,311).
Note: BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
aFrom Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test.
bPreferred number of latent classes.
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Note
1.

Although these variables are related to the indicator variables
for religion in the LCA, religious membership and behavior
are conceptually and analytically distinct from the measures
of religious belief we focus on. Conclusions from regression
models that exclude these and other control variables are consistent with conclusions from models that include controls.
This suggests that the relationships between sociopolitical attitudes and perspectives on science and religion we discuss later
are largely independent of attitudinal differences associated
with other respondent characteristics.
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